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1 HARDWARE DEMO OBJECTIVES
Systems-on-chip (SoCs) are becoming heterogeneous: they
combine general-purpose processor cores with application-
specific hardware components, also known as accelerators,
to improve performance and energy efficiency. The advan-
tages of heterogeneity, however, come at a price of threaten-
ing security. The architectural dissimilarities of processors
and accelerators require revisiting the current security tech-
niques. With this hardware demo, we show how accelerators
can break dynamic information flow tracking (DIFT) [1], a
well-known security technique that protects systems against
software-based attacks. We also describe how the security
guarantees of DIFT can be re-established with a hardware
solution that has low performance and area penalties [2].
2 INTRODUCTION
Dynamic Information Flow Tracking
DIFT [1] is a security technique that prevents a variety of
software-based attacks. The key idea is to use tags to mark
data. For example, in the context of privacy protection the
tags are used to mark as sensitive the data that must not be
leaked out from an application. DIFT decouples the concepts
of policy (what to do) and mechanism (how to do it). The
policy defines which data are sensitive and the restrictions
to apply on their use. The mechanism ensures that the tags
are propagated in the system. We can adopt two schemes to
manage the tags [2]. With the coupled scheme, each tag is
stored physically with its associated data (same address), i.e.,
the memory word is extended to include the tag. With the de-
coupled scheme, the tags are stored separately from the data
(different addresses), often in a protected region in memory.
Target Application and its Vulnerabilities
We consider an application for an assisted living system as a
case study. The application monitors people in a hospital to
detect when a patient needs help, e.g., when a patient falls.
For privacy protection, the faces of the people, for example
those who visit the patients, need to be obfuscated. In this
demo, we focus on the part of the application that performs
face obfuscation. The application applies a blur filter to a
rectangular portion of the input image, called patch, defined
by four parameters: i_row_blur, e_row_blur, i_col_blur and
e_col_blur. It produces as output the same image where the
pixels inside the patch (sensitive information) are blurred.
First, we implemented this function in software and then we
designed an accelerator to perform the same computation
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Fig. 1: Tethered SoC we developed for the demo.
in hardware to improve performance and energy efficiency
(and show why accelerators must be secured with DIFT).
An attacker exploits a vulnerability by modifying the con-
figuration parameters of the application in order to reduce
the size of the obfuscated area or to move it. This attack may
reveal the faces of some people and cause sensitive infor-
mation to leak out. To protect against this attack, we mark
the pixels of the patch as sensitive. All the other pixels are
non-sensitive and thus not marked. We enforce a policy that
requires all data produced as output by either the software
or the hardware implementation must be non-sensitive. The
blur filter makes the information non-sensitive and must be
applied to all the pixels inside the patch (sensitive area). If
an attacker tampers with the sensitive area, we raise an ex-
ception before a sensitive pixel could be produced as output.
Target System-on-Chip Architecture
The application runs on the tethered SoC shown in Fig. 1.
We extended an open-source embedded SoC platform called
PULPino [3] to include support for DIFT. We implemented a
coupled tagging scheme. We extended the RI5CY processor
in PULPino (RV32I ISA) to support tagging and we called it
D-RI5CY [4]. We augmented memories and communication
channels to accommodate the tags (Fig. 1). In addition, we
integrated the accelerator to perform the obfuscation in hard-
ware. The accelerator can be protectedwith theDIFT shell [2].
In the demo, we show that without the DIFT shell the accel-
erator can be used as attack vector to compromise the target
application, even if the rest of the SoC supports DIFT. We
synthesized the SoC platform targeting the reconfigurable
logic available on a ZedBoard (Xilinx XC7Z020). After the
ARM hard-core processor loads the data into the data mem-
ory and the instructions into the instruction memory, the
application executes in bare metal on the soft-core D-RI5CY,
which optionally invokes the accelerator to blur the image.
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Accelerator.We designed the accelerator in SystemC and
synthesized it with high-level synthesis [5, 6]. The software
first configures the accelerators through a set of registers.
The registers arememorymapped and they specifywhere the
input and output images of the accelerator are in memory as
well as the values of the four parameters that define the patch
boundary. Then, the accelerator performs the obfuscation.
DIFT Shell. To support DIFT on the accelerator, we adopted
the PAGURUS methodology [2] to design a shell circuit that
encloses the accelerator and manages the tags required by
DIFT. The accelerator remains unaware of DIFT and does not
need to be modified. The shell intercepts the read and write
requests of the accelerator to the datamemory and it modifies
them to include the tags (for tag propagation). The shell also
checks that the tags are consistent with the security policy
(tag checking), i.e., only the sensitive pixels are obfuscated.
Demo Objectives and Contributions
This demo shows the importance of protecting accelerators
with DIFT. We show that, even if the entire SoC architecture
implements DIFT, a single accelerator that does not support
DIFT is sufficient to compromise an application (in this case
by leaking sensitive information). We also show the effective-
ness of the DIFT shell in protecting the accelerator. The shell
has negligible impact on the performance and cost of the
accelerator, while it offers strong security guarantees. With
respect to other DIFT approaches in the literature, we target
heterogeneous SoCs (see the related work reported in [2]).
3 ASSUMPTIONS AND ATTACK MODEL
We assume that the hardware is trusted, i.e., no hardware
Trojans. The architecture may include some common hard-
ware defenses, e.g., non-executable memory. In this demo we
address software-based attacks, e.g., buffer-overflow attacks,
etc. We assume that the application has one or more vulner-
abilities that permit to modify its configuration parameters.
The attacker tries to exploit these vulnerabilities through
common I/O interfaces, with the goal of affecting the confi-
dentiality of the hardware-accelerated software application.
4 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
D-RI5CY. We extended the data memory of PULPino (data
RAM) from 32KB to 36KB to accommodate the tags. This in-
troduced a 12.5% overhead. The integration of DIFT required
an overall increase in the usage of LUT resources that does
not exceed 0.82% with respect to the original PULPino SoC.
In addition, there is no impact on the processor performance
because the tags are processed in parallel and independently
from the instruction execution across all pipeline stages [4].
Accelerator. We synthesized the accelerator and the shell
with Cadence Stratus HLS 17.20 and Xilinx Vivado 2015.1.
The shell requires only ∼200 LUTs and ∼700 flops/latches.
The performance overhead on the accelerator execution is
negligible (the tags are transferred in parallel with the data).
Fig. 2: The demo runs on a ZedBoard prototyping system.
5 KEY OBSERVATIONS AND OUTCOMES
Weprepared a video of the hardware demo that is available at:
http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~piccolboni/demos/host2019.mp4. The
demo runs on the prototyping system shown in Fig. 2. We
run the application (Section 2) in four different scenarios:
Scenario #1: the software performs the obfuscation (D-
RI5CY); the attack and the DIFT support are disabled;
this shows the expected execution of the application;
Scenario #2: the accelerator performs the obfuscation,
the attack and the DIFT support are still disabled; this
shows the correctness of the hardware accelerator;
Scenario #3: the accelerator performs the obfuscation,
the attack is enabled and the accelerator is not pro-
tected by the DIFT shell; this scenario shows that the
attack succeeds: even if the entire system (except the
accelerator) supports DIFT, the application can be com-
promised by offloading the computation in hardware;
Scenario #4: the accelerator performs the obfuscation,
the attack is enabled and the accelerator is protected
with the shell; this scenario shows that the shell effec-
tively propagates the tags from the processor to the
accelerator and vice versa; in this case the attack fails.
Our demo shows why a holistic DIFT approach is needed
to prevent software-based attacks. While more convoluted
and critical attacks can be implemented, the software-based
attack discussed in this demo is representative of the vulner-
abilities that can be exploited in heterogeneous SoCs [2].
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